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PL:\INTIFF AND APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Ray VanCott, judge 
REPL \" TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The positions taken and arguments advanced in 
Respondent's Brief require reply and some extension of 
the citations of authority and correction of Respondent's 
misunderstanding of the position of Appellant. 
The t\\·o primary problems are dealt with separately 
as follo,vs: 
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I. 
Presumption of due care arising from traumatic amnesia. 
The rule that when an injured person is incapable, 
by reason of the accident, to remember the circumstances 
under 'vhich he was injured, he is entitled to the benefit 
of the presumption of due care, is well settled and by no 
means limited, as indicated in Respondent's argument, 
to the presumption familiar in death cases. 
So 'vell established is the rule that the new edition 
of American Jurisprudence will contain, when the Negli-
gence Volume is completed, the following addition to 
the present Section 293, 38 Am. Jur 987 (Negligence) 
which is now found as a note in the 1964 Supplemental 
folder: 
"Add following Note 10: 
"The rule is \veil established that ,vhere the loss 
of memory or other incapacity rendering the sur-
vivor of an accident incapable of testifying as to 
the accident is sho,vn to be attributable to such 
accident, it 'vill be presumed, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that he exercised due 
care.'' 
It is true that no case precisely in point in Utah has 
been yet decided. This case appears to be the first time 
the matter has been squarely presented to this court. It 
is therefore important here that the wisdom and wide-
spread character of the decisions in our sister states should 
be noticed and the rule be here declared in conformity 
\Yith what is fast becoming universal. No case has been 
noted in any jurisdiction where the validity of the rule 
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has been denied. Without attempting to list here the 
great number of decisions in point (many of \vhich \vill 
be found compiled in ALR Blue Book of Supplemental 
Decisions, Issue No. 10, 1964, p. 44·7 adding citations to 
those compiled in the annotation in 141 ALR 873) the 
follo'"ing list of cases will indicate somewhat jurisdictions 
in which the rule is now \veil established (aside from 
California where there is a great number of cases apply-
ing it) : 
Prewitt v. Rutherford, 238 Iowa 1321, 30 N.W. 
2d 141 
Breaker v. Rosena, 301 Michigan 685, 4 N. W. 2d 
57, 141 ALR 867 (Annotated in ALR) 
[jttle Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 218 SW 
2d 527, .~ffirmed 222 SW 2d 985, 148 Texas 107 
Johnson v. Hetrick, 150 At. 477, 300 Pennsylvanie 
225 
Gregona v. Rushton, 101 A. 2d 768, 174 Pa. Super. 
-ll7 
Rutovitsky v. Magliocco, 14 7 At. 2d 153, 394 Pa. 
387 
Kreft v. Charles, 268 Wisconsin 44, 66 N. \A,T. 2d 618 
Teeter v. MS&], 342 P. 2d 864 (New Mexico) 
The clarity of the rule is indicated in the following 
quotation from Gregona vs. Rushton, cited immediately 
above. quoted and followed in Rutovitsky vs. M aggliocco, 
above. In the Gregona case the plaintiff survived and tes-
tified that he couldn't remember the details. He woke up 
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in a hospital 14 days after the accident. In the Rutovitsky 
case the time involved was 6 hours: 
"Furthermore, since pJflintiff testified that he re-
membered nothing from the time he stepped onto 
the Chester Road on August 21, 1950, until he 
regained consciousness in a hospital some 14 days 
later, he was entitled to the presumption that he 
did all the law required him to do and was not 
contributorily negligent. (Heaps vs. So. Pac. Trac. 
Co. 276 Pa. 551, 120 At. 548) Such presumption 
is overcome so as to render the question of con-
tributory negligence a matter of law only where 
undisputed testimony and the inferences from it 
point only to one conclusion." 
There is no occasion for the alarm expressed by 
Respondent about the application of the rule to this case. 
When it is remembered that what is involved here is the 
matter of denial of a jury trial, that the loss of memory 
is clearly shown to be due to the injury (R. 73, 74) and 
relates to crucial matters, every principle of justice and 
reason supports invocation of the rule. In other words, 
appellant is not asking this court to make any finding 
beyond the point that a presumption exists giving rise to 
questions on which the minds of reasonable men may 
differ, and to the right to trial by jury. 
At pages 14 and 15 of Respondent's Brief proposi-
tions are urged having to do with parties who have 
"faulty recollections". Such cases are irrelevant to the 
present issues, which are limited to traumatic amnesia 
which may subside by the time of the trial (See the 
opinion of Dr. Morro"v R. 74) or may not. Cases simply 
involving failure to recall are not involved. 
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II. 
In italics at pages 10 and 11 of Respondent's Brief 
is urged that "Nowhere in her Brief, however, does 
Appellant point out those facts or evidence upon which 
a jury could conclude that she was in the exercise of 
due care." 
In response to this charge, we respectfully point to 
certain decisions of this honorable Court, and the facts 
adverted to in the Appellant's Brief: 
In Covington vs. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 
P ( 2) 788, this court said 
"~lodem traffic complexities make it impossible 
to lay down by judicial rule what will always be, 
or fail to be, reasonable care in the operation of 
motor vehicles. The duty to keep a proper lookout 
is manifest, but the obedience to or violation of 
that duty must be determined according to par-
ticular circumstances and in accord with the 
constantly varying exigencies occasioning each 
accident. As to what constitutes a proper lookout 
is usually, therefore, a latter-day classic question 
for jury determination, and each trial and ap-
pellate court must determine the question as a 
matter of law only when convinced that reason-
able persons could not disagree upon the question 
when conscientiously applying fact to law." 
(Emphasis ours). 
In Best vs. Huber, 3 Utah 2d 177, 281 P(2) 208 this 
court repeated its pronouncement in Linden vs. Anchor 
.\fin. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 P. 355, 358: 
"\Vhere there is uncertainty as to the existence of 
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either negligence or contributory negligence the 
question is not one of law but of fact, and to be 
settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty 
arises from a conflict in testimony or because, the 
facts being undisputed, fair minded men will 
honestly draw different conclusions from them." 
With these rules in mind it is not difficult to find pre-
cedent in Utah decisions establishing the fact that honest 
men may draw different conclusions from the facts in 
this case. 
It is not disputed that Appellant looked along the 
street, saw cars, two of them, two blocks ( 660 feet long, 
each, or one-quarter of a mile) away, moving toward 
her at a speed of about 20 miles per hour (R. 32, lines 
29-30). In the concurring opinion of Justice Wade of 
this court, in Mingus vs. Olson 114 Utah 505, it is said: 
In the same case, the Court said : 
"If defendant was 133 feet away when they 
stepped from the curb into the street and traveling 
only 20 miles per hour, he \vould have ample time 
to sound his horn and stop in time to avoid the 
accident. Thus, under these circumstances, I think 
it would be a jury case." 
In the same case, the Court said: 
"The duty to look has inherent in it the duty. t~ 
see what is there to be seen, and to pay heed to It. 
The case of Coombs vs. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 
P 2d 680 is an even more impressive precedent. We note 
these words: 
"It is to be borne in mind that although the 
motorist and pedestrian are both required to 
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exercise the same standard of care, that of the 
ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances, 
that standard imposes upon the motorist a greater 
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian, be-
cause of the potential danger to others in the 
operation of an automobile." 
* * * 
·•It is deducible that at the time plaintiff looked 
to the north the defendant *** at least was not 
necessarily so close to plaintiff to be a threat to 
hrr safety, and consequently that she did not step 
from a place of safety to a place of danger as 
defendant charges." 
.~\t pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's Brief there are 
detailed the facts "·hich so clearly invoke the issues of 
last clear chance in this case. The facts above noted, and 
the rules expressed by this court make it eminently clear 
that Respondent shoulrl have avoided hitting Appellant 
if he had been obeying the lookout rule. She was within 
a couple of steps of the edge of the road. He had a 
\ride, clear road in \vhich to pass; Appellant was in 
sudden, dire, inextricable peril of which Respondent had 
reason to know in the exercise of due caution. Note the 
expression of this Court in Beckstrom vs. Williams 282 
P 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210: 
".We are therefore concerned only \vith that por-
tion of the rule which would permit a plaintiff 
in extricable peril to recover from one who had 
reasons to kno'v of the peril and to avoid in juring 
him. Section 4 79 states the rule thus: 
".\ plaintiff "·ho has negligently subjected himself 
to a risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent 
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negligence may recover for harm caused thereby 
if immediately preceding the harm '(a) the plain-
tiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reason-
able vigilance and care and (b) the defendant *** 
would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and 
thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless 
peril had he exercised the vigilance which it was 
his duty to plaintiff to exercise and (c) thereafter 
is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable 
care and competence his then existing ability to 
avoid harming the plaintiff." 
Commenting on this rule in AJ arcellin vs. Osgul· 
thorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1, 236 P 2d 779, this court said: 
"Under such circumstances the plaintiff's negli-
gence has come to rest and is not a concurring 
proximate cause of the injury, but the negligence 
of the defendant is the later, intervening, sole 
proximate cause." 
and ordered a ne\v trial. 
It is not amiss to comment that in the Beckstrom 
case this court noted the rule that on appeal it is the 
duty of the court to consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff in determining whether or 
not the case should have been submitted to the jury on 
the doctrine of last clear chance. 
The case of M arcellin vs. Osgulthorpe is illuminat-
ing on this matter of avoiding something in the road. In 
that case there was a car projecting into the highway on 
the right hand side, and another car parked on the left, 
and applying the rule of evidence above stated, this court 
said: 
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"l"hcrc is no reason to assume that the defendant 
had to apprehend that the plaintiff would not see 
the Cadillac which was in plain sight on the high-
'"ay in front of him with the tail lights on, nor 
that he \vould continue at a negligent rate of 
speed, nor that he would fail to guide his car 
safely bet,,·een the other two. There was actually 
room to clear by several feet on either side." 
In the present case there was ample room. 
\Vith the foregoing explanatory and answering com-
ments, it is respcctfulJy submitted that there exists in this 
rase ample room for difference of opinion between reason-
able men, and that the trial court erred prejudicially in 
denying the right to jury trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BELL & BELL and C. BEN MARTIN 
303 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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